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Being an epidemiologist means always having to say that you are sorry. Epidemiology 
has always been criticised for problems of lack of randomization of exposures, 
misclassification of exposures and outcomes, and inadequate control of confounding
1
. 
Nevertheless, epidemiologists continue to make important scientific discoveries, 
ranging from Snow‟s work on cholera2, to the discovery of tobacco smoking3 and 
asbestos
4
 as major causes of lung cancer, through to more recent discoveries such as 
the link between HPV and cervical cancer
5
. All of these discoveries took decades to 
become accepted, but eventually successful public health interventions followed. We 
must be doing something right. 
 
Of course, we can also get things wrong, and there are many examples of findings 
which hit the headlines, but were not replicated when further studies are done
6
. It is 
therefore not surprising that the public may be sceptical of epidemiological findings
6
. 
Perhaps the problem is not that epidemiology is more prone to error than other 
sciences (basic researchers, e.g. geneticists, probably get things wrong at least as 
often, and often hype up their findings even more than we do), but that our mistakes 
may be more likely to hit the headlines. Examples include studies of beta carotene and 
cardiovascular disease, hormone replacement therapy, vitamin E and vitamin C intake 
in relation to cardiovascular disease, or fibre intake in relation to colon cancer
7
.  
 
However, these examples of “epidemiological failures” primarily involve studies of 
lifestyle factors (particularly diet). These are notoriously difficult to study, since the 
“exposed group” (e.g. those with high beta carotene levels in their diets) will often be 
markedly different from the “non-exposed group” with respect to many different 
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lifestyle factors. Ironically, there are some areas of epidemiological research which 
are less prone to error, but these are often the areas in which there is the most 
controversy
8
. In particular, there are usually only relatively minor problems of 
confounding in occupational epidemiology, since there are usually only minor 
differences in smoking, diet, etc, between different groups of workers
9
, but this  is 
perhaps the field of epidemiology where the findings are most likely to be disputed. 
 
These controversies are not occurring in a vacuum
8
. The difficulties of conducting 
epidemiological research, are exacerbated by the activities of companies that are 
unhappy with the findings of such studies. The usual approach is for the company 
concerned to hire consultants to criticise the research publicly, either when it appears 
in print, or even prior to publication
10
. In recent years, these efforts have been further 
developed and refined with the use of websites and publicity that stigmatizes 
unwelcome research findings as “junk science”11. In some instances these activities 
have gone as far as efforts to block publication
12
. Recent examples include attempts to 
influence studies on the toxicity of benzene 
13
 and diesel particulate matter
14
, the 
various industry efforts over many years to influence the conduct and interpretation of 
research into the health effects of dioxin
15
, the industry campaign to undermine an 
OSHA chromium (VI) standard 
16
 and corporate infiltration of a panel convened to set 
standards for chromium (VI) in California
17
. More recently, epidemiology in general, 
and occupational epidemiology in particular, have been criticised for a inherent 
tendency to produce false positive findings
18
, a view which has been disputed by other 
epidemiologists including myself
19
. 
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These controversies set the context for current proposals to require the registration of 
observational studies. These were discussed at a workshop
20
 organised by the 
European Centre for Ecotoxicology and Toxicology of Chemicals (ECETOC), and are 
summarised and supported by the paper by Rushton
21
. The workshop report argued 
that registration of clinical trials is now required by law, or by ethics committees, in 
many parts of the world, and that this should be extended to epidemiological studies. 
This proposal has received largely critical comments from epidemiologists
22-28
 but 
some support from medical journals
29 30
. I was invited to participate in the workshop, 
but declined, since I considered it to be inappropriate for such a workshop to be 
sponsored by an agency funded by the chemical industry
29
. Furthermore, the task of 
fostering good epidemiological practice is already being undertaken by professional 
societies such as the International Epidemiological Association
31
, and through the 
STROBE guidelines
32
. 
 
There are several reasons why the proposal to require registration of epidemiological 
studies is unnecessary and misguided, and would do more harm than good, both in 
scientific and in public health terms. These stem from the differences between 
randomised clinical trials and observational studies, which were not recognised by the 
ECETOC Workshop report
22 27 28
. 
 
Firstly, the reasons for the requirement for the registration of clinical trials are not the 
same as those that have been proposed for observational studies. The main reason for 
registration of clinical trials is to avoid the non-publication of “true negatives” (the 
“file-drawer” problem24) where an intervention is found not to work, or even to be 
harmful, and the investigators, or the study funders, are reluctant to publish the 
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findings (a recent example of this is the Vioxx scandal
33 34
). In contrast, the main 
reason proposed for the registration of observational studies is that they may produce 
“false positive” findings, which may not have been a priori hypotheses, but which 
may be “cherry picked”24,and may receive more media attention than is warranted. 
This is a different problem, which requires a different solution. In particular, we 
should not be making any decisions on the basis of a single study - we should be 
considering the totality of the evidence. When evaluating a particular study, we 
should be asking “what was the evidence for this hypothesis before the study was 
done, and what information does this study add?” not “what was in the mind of the 
investigator before the study was started?” A finding which confirms an a priori 
hypothesis may be unconvincing if there was little prior evidence for the hypothesis, 
whereas a finding based on a post hoc hypothesis may be quite convincing if there 
was strong prior evidence (whether or not this was known to the investigator 
beforehand). For example, the discovery that cat ownership may actually protect 
against the development of asthma, was apparently first discovered “by accident” and 
then confirmed by post hoc analyses of a number of existing data sets
35
. Of course, a 
study may assess a large number of risk factors (e.g. occupational cancer case-control 
studies using occupational titles), many of which do not have any a priori evidence of 
risk, but this problem can be readily addressed using semi-Bayesian methods
36
. 
Furthermore, the problem of “publication bias” can be readily addressed by making 
full tables of findings available online. In addition, it is straightforward for editors to 
request that “authors report in their papers a clear statement of whether the study 
hypothesis arose before or after the inspection of the data”30 – this does not require 
pre-registration of studies. 
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Secondly, clinical trials involve interventions, whereas observational studies do not
26
. 
Thus, there is a deeper ethical obligation to the participants to publish information so 
acquired, both because the participants have assented to a degree of risk in being 
randomized to what may be an inferior treatment, and because that information may 
have more direct impact and relevance to intervention decisions. As Vandenbroucke 
notes
27, “there is a fundamental divide between the purpose of clinical trials, where 
results may determine medical interventions in millions of patients, and that of 
observational research that searches to understand the occurrence of disease”. The 
former approach not only raises major issues about monitoring and reporting of 
adverse events, but it also means that the findings are more directly relevant to health 
policy and clinical practice. On the other hand, an observational study that reports, for 
example, that a particular chemical is associated with an increased risk of a particular 
type of cancer, is very unlikely to produce immediate policy decisions; rather, it is 
likely to feed into a large body of other evidence, e.g. in the International Agency for 
Research on Cancer (IARC) Monograph series
37
. Even when intervention is seen as 
needed, the form of that intervention is left wide open by evidence of risk (e.g., do we 
seek to eliminate or merely reduce the exposure? and how to do either?), whereas by 
its very nature a trial incorporates an explicit intervention protocol. 
 
 
Thirdly, “the proposal is at odds with the way that progress is made in medical 
science”27, and in science in general. “Historians and philosophers of science would 
recoil at the notion than advance registration of all scientific studies … would produce 
better science”25. Should Darwin have pre-registered his hypotheses before 
commencing the voyage of the Beagle? And would his theory of natural selection be 
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more valid if he had? Should Watson and Crick have pre-registered their studies of 
DNA (if they had, they probably would have been stopped, because of competing 
claims from other researchers and interference from the British Medical Research 
Council 
38
). Should we pre-register our studies of the health effects of climate change? 
Observational sciences, including cosmology, evolutionary biology, ecology, geology, 
and many others, do not proceed in the neat and organised way that is the case (to 
some extent) with randomised controlled trials. Observational science is so much 
more messy, exciting, and valuable, than that. 
 
Fourthly, some protocol adaptations may improve, rather than compromise, the 
validity of the research
22
. These may improve recruitment, allow more accurate 
measurements (e.g. by incorporating new laboratory methods), achieve better control 
of confounding (e.g. by controlling for risk factors „discovered‟ after the original 
protocol was written), or incorporate improved methods of data analysis (e.g. 
Bayesian methods for multiple comparisons). There is a danger that editors and 
reviewers will be encouraged to simply compare submitted manuscripts with 
registered protocols
22
. 
 
Finally, the proposal for registration of observational studies adds yet another obstacle 
to initiating, conducting and publishing epidemiological research, an obstacle which is 
“unjustified and insidious”26. I have previously written that “for every epidemiologist 
trying to change a light bulb, there are now several critics hired by industry to argue 
that they are doing it the wrong way, or that it is not broken and doesn‟t need 
changing at all, or that they have changed it the wrong way and should do it again.”39 
We can now also be criticised for not registering our intention to change the light bulb 
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in advance. Inevitably, this proposal will be misused to prevent or delay the 
publication of inconvenient findings
8 12 39
, despite the best of intentions on the part of 
the Workshop participants. 
 
Of course, it‟s difficult to oppose any measure that appears to be fostering better 
epidemiological practice. No-one would oppose “better control of confounding”, so 
who would oppose “better documentation and conduct of epidemiological studies”? 
There is plenty of room for improvement, so why would we oppose any measure that 
aims to improve the quality of epidemiological research? Of course we should always 
attempt to improve the quality of our research, but the proposal for registration of 
epidemiological studies will not achieve this goal. At best it will be a waste of time, 
and at worst it will be hazardous for science, and for public health. There are plenty of 
better ways to improve the quality of published epidemiological research including 
better promotion and enforcement of rules for good epidemiological practice
31 32
, and 
better training of researchers, reviewers, reporters, and above all, editors
25
. 
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